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Abstract
Background: Current healthcare systems have extended the evidence-based medicine (EBM) approach to health 
policy and delivery decisions, such as access-to-care, healthcare funding and health program continuance, through 
attempts to integrate valid and reliable evidence into the decision making process. These policy decisions have major 
impacts on society and have high personal and financial costs associated with those decisions. Decision models such 
as these function under a shared assumption of rational choice and utility maximization in the decision-making 
process.
Discussion: We contend that health policy decision makers are generally unable to attain the basic goals of evidence-
based decision making (EBDM) and evidence-based policy making (EBPM) because humans make decisions with their 
naturally limited, faulty, and biased decision-making processes. A cognitive information processing framework is 
presented to support this argument, and subtle cognitive processing mechanisms are introduced to support the focal 
thesis: health policy makers' decisions are influenced by the subjective manner in which they individually process 
decision-relevant information rather than on the objective merits of the evidence alone. As such, subsequent health 
policy decisions do not necessarily achieve the goals of evidence-based policy making, such as maximizing health 
outcomes for society based on valid and reliable research evidence.
Summary: In this era of increasing adoption of evidence-based healthcare models, the rational choice, utility 
maximizing assumptions in EBDM and EBPM, must be critically evaluated to ensure effective and high-quality health 
policy decisions. The cognitive information processing framework presented here will aid health policy decision 
makers by identifying how their decisions might be subtly influenced by non-rational factors. In this paper, we identify 
some of the biases and potential intervention points and provide some initial suggestions about how the EBDM/EBPM 
process can be improved.
Background
High expenditures in healthcare have stimulated health-
care policy makers to explore more effective and efficient
healthcare delivery options. For example, in 2008 national
health expenditures in the US were $2.3 trillion, or $7,681
per person on average, and accounted for 16.2 percent of
the gross domestic product (GDP) [1]. This figure is
expected to reach 19.3 percent of GDP by 2019, or
approximately $4.5 trillion, the highest per capita expen-
ditures in the world [1]. Given the high societal costs of
healthcare and potential benefits of improved delivery
and enhanced population health, strong incentives exist
to improve health policy decision making. In the global
health arena, numerous individual, political, and market
forces influence the traditional health policy decision
making environment [1-5]. While many forces influence
policy making, this article focuses on the influence of
individual cognitive information processing. Research
investigating individual decision making has identified
cognitive information processing as a key factor in the
decision-making process [6-8]. A cognitive information-
processing approach accounts for internally generated
mechanisms by which relevant decision-making informa-
tion is processed by individuals and individuals partici-
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pating in group decision making [9,10]. This is in contrast
to externally generated mechanisms of influence, such as
political will, interest groups, and economic factors [3-5].
Understanding a health policy decision-making task
requires policy makers to recognize various individual
factors that influence their decision making, both indi-
vidually and when in groups [11-13]. As such, public
health policy is a valuable context in which to consider
the role of cognitive processing of decision information.
While competing influences on decision making are not
new topics, the recent emphasis in public policy on evi-
dence-based decision making (EBDM) and evidence-
based policy making (EBPM) reinforces the need to
examine some of the factors that bias the decision-mak-
ing process. We believe recognition of the mechanics of
cognitive processing will assist health policy makers in
identifying how their policy decisions are internally influ-
enced, and how decisions might be subsequently
improved.
In many countries, the nature of public policy dictates
that health policy makers are subject to decision influ-
ences from different stakeholders, including the media,
public opinion polls, funding agencies, managed-care
organizations, and special interest groups [4,5,13-20]. In
addition to various stakeholders, policy decisions are sub-
ject to judicial rulings, political mandates, policy legacies,
perceptions of policy importance, and, most currently,
the growing drive to utilize an evidence-based approach
to health policy making [3,13,21-27]. These myriad of
influence sources can be classified as external informa-
tion that policy makers must cognitively process in order
to arrive at a final decision. In addition, many models
guiding the policy making process assume policy makers
are capable of accurately analyzing decision information,
understanding the relevant evidence, are resistant to
influences and biases, and seek to make decisions that
maximize societal benefit [5,19,27,28]. These assump-
tions are essentially the hallmarks of linear, rational pol-
icy objectives, mirror the dynamics of rational choice
decision models (Figure 1), and also reflect many of the
tenets of EBDM and EBPM [2,5,13,14,24-27]. However,
these objectives and models collectively fail to consider
the decision-making literature, which shows these
assumptions are problematic, incomplete, and, in some
cases, false [19,29-33].
Utilizing health policy decision making as a basis, this
article presents a theoretical decision-processing frame-
work that supports the focal thesis: during the health pol-
icy process, decision makers are subjectively influenced
by the manner in which they cognitively process informa-
tion. Articulating cognitive processing barriers that pol-
icy makers experience in real-world decision choices and
in the context of the rigorous demands of evidence-based
decision and evidence-based policy making (hereafter
referred to as EBDM) will challenge many of the assump-
t i o n s  t h a t  h e a l t h  p o l i c y  m a k i n g  i s  s t r o n g l y  g u i d e d  b y
research [13,15,22,23,34,35]. Recognizing and under-
standing cognitive processing limitations and biases may
facilitate a more realistic evidence-based approach in all
facets of health policy decision making [5,22,24,25,36-
38].
Discussion
EBDM: The challenges of rational choice
Numerous healthcare systems exist globally, yet many of
the same factors influence the direction of health policy
regardless of national boundaries. Factors include diver-
sity in healthcare coverage, societal demands for the pro-
vision of healthcare, technological advances in
diagnostics, quality of care initiatives, and a rapidly
changing healthcare workforce [2,4,13,18,39]. Some
argue that one of the strongest forces driving health pol-
icy change is the dissemination and adoption of evidence-
based medicine (EBM) and EBDM practices within
health systems [3,16,25,38,40]. The growing prominence
of EBDM in healthcare and health policy is due to such
factors as cost considerations, the increasing prevalence
of managed care organizations and third party payers, the
need to ensure appropriate usage of health interventions,
and public calls for accountability and affordability
[13,18,25,40]. Public policy literature has indentified that
numerous key decision makers believe evidence-based
health policy and the inclusion of evidence in public pol-
icy making is both a desirable and an attainable policy
goal [13,16,25].
Figure 1 Evidence-Based Rational Choice Decision Model.
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While EBDM offers potential value in enhancing public
policy, by its nature it assumes a degree of individual
rationality in the decision process on the part of decision
makers [16,24,41,42]. However, decision-making research
has shown that relevant data may be distorted and/or
ignored while decision processing is occurring [24,42-44].
Given that EBDM is increasingly called for in key health
p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s ,  s u c h  a s  r e s o u r c e  a l l o c a t i o n ,  p r o g r a m
determination, funding, and measuring program effec-
tiveness[14-16], it is critically important to examine the
mechanics of information processing and decision mak-
ing in order to guide successful EBDM [18,24,43].
The rational choice principle that governs EBDM
assumes that policy makers have the required cognitive
abilities and knowledge to interpret, process, understand,
and determine the validity of scientific evidence relevant
to policy decisions [2,16,33,45]. However, decision-mak-
ing research has shown that decision makers, even if they
have access to required information and have relevant
expertise, may not engage in complex cognitive informa-
tion processing when making decisions [13,15,44,46-50].
For example, cognitive processing research has identified
both bounded rationality and 'satisficing' as limitations to
complex cognitive processing [2,15,44,46-50]. Bounded
rationality defines the situation where decision makers
are limited in their abilities to search for a solution; there-
fore, they 'satisfice', by choosing the first alternative that
meets or 'satisfies' minimum criteria for solving the prob-
lem rather than continuing the search for the optimal
solution [2,13,32,44,46,49,50]. Satisficing alternatives may
be subject to a number of diverse influences, which sup-
port the position that policy makers can be subject to
non-rational decision influences [13,25,41,47,51-53].
The nature of cognitive information processing is fur-
ther highlighted in one stream of the public policy litera-
t u r e  t h a t  a r g u e s  t h a t  r e l e v a n t  r e s e a r c h  i s  f r e q u e n t l y
ignored by policy makers [15,25,29,38,40,53]. The pleth-
ora of evidence and the variety of methods by which evi-
dence is presented (e.g., randomized clinical trials,
systematic reviews, and qualitative case studies) com-
pounds the uncertainty for policy makers in attempting
to assess 'what is evidence' and how to assess the strength
of the evidence [13]. For example, one critical factor that
has arisen is the question of the policy makers' ability to
judge the quality and applicability of research results
[13,16,25,38,40]. Issues such as study results emanating
from multiple scientific disciplines, use of specialized jar-
gon, and sophisticated statistical analyses can impede
policy makers' understanding [13]. As such, it is posited
that numerous individuals do not have the broad ranging
expertise to adequately assess scientific information
across health policy domains, thus they will satisfice their
decision information needs and rely on secondary
sources that summarize research results and translate the
findings into 'lay' language. In other words, the assumed
rational, utility maximizing decision-making processes
begin to break down.
With respect to the value or utility of a decision, the
nature of democratic political systems endorses policy
makers' efforts to pursue maximal public satisfaction with
government decision making [4,16,30,54-56]. Utility
maximization originates in expected utility theory, which
contends that a decision maker will make a rational
choice to maximize his/her utility (gain) by choosing the
decision option with the greatest probable gain [47]. If
public policy models imply that policy makers seek to
a t t a i n  g r e a t e s t  s o c i e t a l  u t i l i t y ,  a n o t h e r  a s s u m p t i o n  i s
being made regarding the rationality of public policy
decision making [25,30,54,57]. Decision-making research
has demonstrated that a decision maker's utility is highly
subjective and may include variables, such as personal
gain, risk tolerance, relevance to related events, and value
of a decision to the organization [22,28,44,46,47,54].
Complicating the picture further is the observation that
policy makers are forming policy in response to and in
conjunction with groups of individuals, all with individ-
ual objectives and biases. Group decisions are argued to
be superior to individual decision making in that they tap
into a wider knowledge base, generally create more infor-
mation, and theoretically are more open to decision
information examination [58,59]. However, there have
been many studies demonstrating group decision phe-
nomena, such as groupthink and non-rational escalation
of commitment, which exhibit cognitive decision-making
behaviors that impede and prevent rational decision
choices by groups [58-60]. While the nature of decision
making in groups is outside the focus of this paper, it is
key to note that groups are comprised of individuals.
Therefore, despite the expectation of rationality in policy
decision making, policy makers' decisions can include
individual and group utility factors and be a source of bias
because decision information is rooted in individual cog-
nitive processing [44-50,61].
In summary, health policy makers are charged with the
responsibility of making effective and utility maximizing
policy decisions regarding their respective health systems
in a theoretically evidence-based environment
[3,13,20,40]. Yet, many authors argue that the nature of
the milieu in which healthcare decisions are made, the
limited understanding of the decision makers regarding
their own biases, and the complexity of evidence does not
support a direct translation of research evidence into
decisions [13,19,41]. Therefore, despite the positive
intent of EBDM, health policy outcomes may actually be,
to a varying extent, subjectively derived
[22,23,33,40,45,61]. We argue that the use of research in
policy decision making should not focus on whether evi-
dence is used but how evidence is processed to informMcCaughey and Bruning Implementation Science 2010, 5:39
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decision making and the contexts in which decision mak-
ing occurs [3,23,61]. In order to meet health policy objec-
tives such as evidence-informed or evidence-based
decisions, there must be a clear understanding of how
individual cognitive processing influences the decision-
making process [62]. Given the extremely high and
i n c r e a s i n g  c o s t s  o f  h e a l t h c a r e ,  w e  h o p e  t h a t  i m p r o v e -
ments in the health policy decision-making processes will
yield positive returns to society and its citizenry.
Cognitive information processing framework
Social information processing models view cognitive pro-
cessing as occurring in two stages [9,10,63-65]. Wyer and
Srull [10] have proposed one of most recognized infor-
m a t i o n  p r oc es s i n g  m od e ls,  w h i c h  wi l l  be  u s ed  h e r e  t o
provide the structure for the basic cognitive information
processing discussion (Figure 2). The first stage, entitled
the 'spontaneous stage' (a non-processing, automatic
function) will be briefly discussed here. Intervention at
the automatic stage is more challenging because the stage
involves almost reflexive perceptual mechanisms. The
second stage, entitled the 'deliberate stage', involves more
active information processing. During this active process-
ing, individual biases and subjectivity can be identified as
information processing drivers known to influence deci-
sion making and, thus, will be the focus of this paper.
In Wyer and Srull's [10] deliberate stage of information
processing, the major purpose is to articulate how indi-
viduals pursue their goals and objectives (may be con-
scious or subconscious) through the manner in which
information is processed. Goals can be general (e.g., form
a n  i m p r e s s i o n  a b o u t  a n  e v e n t / p e r s o n ) ,  o r  t h ey  c a n  b e
quite specific (e.g. decide what course of action to take to
resolve a problem). The cognitive interaction between
goal identification/clarification and deliberative process-
ing is such that the information subsequently recalled and
the resulting decision is directly reflective of the informa-
tion processing objectives [9]. For example, the objective
to evaluate whether a health policy is effective (i.e., has it
resolved the identified health problem) may lead policy
makers to pay attention to different aspects of the policy
information and process the information differently than
if the objective is to determine whether the policy fulfills
the election mandates of the governing party.
In other words, incoming raw information in the auto-
matic processing stage is interpreted, categorized, and
encoded. Information requiring no further processing
and having no link to a current goal requiring further
deliberation generates an automatic response and exits
the cognitive processing cycle [9,63]. However, informa-
tion identified as relevant to an existing objective or goal
proceeds to the deliberative stage, or 'cognitive working
space' [10]. At this stage, goals drive the cognitive search
for memory and knowledge with which to process incom-
ing information [63]. The nature of goals as drivers of
information processing suggests that goals filter informa-
tion processing and determine what information is
attained, retained, and utilized. The attachment of indi-
vidual goals to the processing of information presents an
opportunity for subtle influence on policy decisions. For
example, how individuals define policy goals such as
Figure 2 Cognitive Processing Model (Deliberative Stage Only).
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those with a 'greatest societal benefit' maxim will influ-
ence how information is further processed.
According to the Wyer and Srull model [10], once in
the deliberative processing stage, information that
requires greater conceptualization and sense making is
compared to existing categories in memory, called stor-
age bins. These memory or storage bins contain catego-
ries of individual knowledge, including general
knowledge, goal knowledge, and person/group/event
knowledge. Retrieval of information from memory bins is
thought to be triggered by new information that matches
existing representations of previous experiences and
information [9,10]. Included in the storage bins are
schema, which associate different pieces of information
together. For example, health policy makers seeking to
make policy determinations regarding healthcare for chil-
dren may have existing knowledge of policies relevant to
that population group in memory storage that is then
brought forward as matching information. General
knowledge contains one's information about how the
world functions. Goal knowledge consists of information
one possesses about typical goals individuals have in spe-
cific circumstances and the means by which these goals
influence information retrieval and evaluation. Informa-
tion is processed to support the attainment of relevant
goals. Person, event, and group knowledge, commonly
organized as schema, consists of knowledge about typical
representations of the specific person, event, or group. In
the health policy maker example above, in a 'children'
schema, decision makers may have stored information
about generalized characteristics of the children group
that might affect their policy decision-making process.
( F o r  a  m o r e  c o m p l e t e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  s oc i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n
processing and memory bins, please see Wyer and Srull,
1986). Memory bins act as a source of personal experi-
ence and knowledge and tend to guide decision making in
healthcare environments [40].
The comparative process that links new information
with existing cognitive representations (e.g., schema) cap-
tures the concept of cognitive testing for information
validity. Cognitive representations are drawn from mem-
ory and matched with new information. Judgments about
similarity to representations of existing knowledge (gen-
eral, goal, person/group/event) might lead to comprehen-
sion and, more importantly, validates the new incoming
information [9,10]. Ultimately, deliberate processing
results in a final cognitive outcome that allows a decision
maker to reach a conclusion, impression, or decision that
is directly related to his/her previous experiences and
biases. Thus, the decision-making process is substantially
more complex than suggested by assumptions governing
evidence-based rational choice decision models. More-
over, the very nature of cognitive processing highlights
the role of internally generated influences that occur dur-
ing cognitive processing, influencing a policy maker and
serving as a source of non-rational decision making
[28,32,46,47].
Cognitively generated decision-making influences
Research into cognitive processing has identified three
major sources of influence on how information is pro-
cessed and evaluated: decision maker utility, affect, and
heuristics [66-69]. The following sections articulate how
these factors function within a cognitive information pro-
cessing model (Figure 3), and how they influence the
identification and evaluation of decision evidence in ways
that may subtly influence health policy decision making.
Decision maker utility
M a n y  p o l i c y  t h e o r i s t s  c a l l  f o r  p o l i c y  m a k i n g  t o  f o c u s
more on understanding the decision process rather than
on making decisions that seek maximization of societal
utility [30,31,54]. We would argue that understanding and
improving the decision making process and clarifying
policy goals could help generate policies more attuned to
both societal and individual needs. Furthermore, the
decision-making literature has identified that the utility
of a situation to a decision maker can ultimately influence
his/her decisions [6]. Personal utility influences internally
generated mechanisms in the policy decision process and
is described as the individual's subjective utility.
Expected utility theory posits that decision makers fac-
ing decision alternatives will evaluate each alternative
independently, with respect to perceived value and the
probability of occurrence. These 'computations' result in
a final value attached to each option that identifies a max-
imal gain choice [47,70-72]. Prospect theory, however,
demonstrates that a decision maker's perceived utility can
be subjectively influenced by the manner in which the
information is framed (as a loss/gain or risk/no risk),
what reference is being used to evaluate the options, and
the relationship/salience of the alternative to the decision
maker [47,70-74]. Prospect theory argues that a decision
maker's utility derives from different cognitive evalua-
tions of each prospect (decision option) and is reflective
of how the options are framed (for a detailed account of
the cognitive processing and prospect evaluation, see
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Decision-making research
has demonstrated that individual utility is a subjective
factor and is influenced by personal preferences, desires/
wants of the decision maker, degree of emotion involved
in the decision, the degree of decision risk with respect to
outcome certainty, and personal values [46,48,70,75].
The nature of decision maker utility is such that policy
makers might experience differing utility perceptions
when considering policy options, and thus be subject to
varying, subtle influences. The classic decision-making
example of these utility influences is Tversky and Kahne-McCaughey and Bruning Implementation Science 2010, 5:39
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man's [28] Asian disease problem, which demonstrates
that the manner in which a health problem is framed can
elicit different responses to the same problem. In the
original study and numerous replications, participants
are presented with two choices of health programs to
combat a theoretical disease outbreak [28,72,74]. The
same problem and numeric outcomes are presented;
however, one program's outcomes are presented as num-
ber of lives saved while the other program's outcomes are
presented as number of fatalities. Consistently, the major-
ity of participants will select their program choices based
on how the information regarding lives saved/fatalities
rates is framed [28,70,72-74]. The Asian disease example
clearly demonstrates the influence of framing on decision
alternative utility assessment and exemplifies how evi-
dence is subjectively interpreted and used to make
healthcare decisions. Other studies have demonstrated
that manipulated information related to the perceived
utility of a decision option can evoke inconsistent prefer-
ences or preferences that vary based on how the informa-
tion is presented or framed. These inconsistencies have
been shown in mental health policy, surgical interven-
tions, and government regulations [32,67,70]. Further-
m or e ,  poli cy  m ak e r s i n hea lt hca r e  ha ve  been f ound t o
incorporate their self-interests (their personal utility)
when prioritizing and developing policy [22]. Personal
utility assessments often cloud relevant societal level
assessments of policy alternatives and/or drive the overall
assessment of decision options. Thus, individual utility
evidences the power to override the laudable public goals
of maximizing societal utility when policy decision mak-
ing takes place.
Following the tenets of social information processing
theory and research supporting prospect theory, the
nature of goal-directed cognitive processing suggests that
a decision maker's utility is governed by his/her goals,
which can be subjective in nature [10]. Inclusion of a sub-
jective utility function as part of a cognitive information
processing framework is necessary to more accurately
understand health policy decision making. We argue that
utility perceptions of decision makers are governed by
goals retrieved during the goal-directed information pro-
cessing stage and influence which information is
retrieved and how it is evaluated. The evidence support-
ing utility as a subjective factor and its amenability to
manipulation leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1a: Policy decisions may be more likely to
represent individual (identified by the policy maker's
goals) rather than societal utility and are more likely
Figure 3 The Cognitive Information Processing Framework for Health Policy Decision Making.
Decision 
Maker  Utility
Decision 
Information
Comprehension 
& Integration
Deliberative 
Processing
Health Policy 
Decision Choice
Goal 
Clarification g g
Heuristics Affect
Memory & Knowledge Bins
￿Goals Goals
￿People & Events
￿General KnowledgeMcCaughey and Bruning Implementation Science 2010, 5:39
http://www.implementationscience.com/content/5/1/39
Page 7 of 13
to be supported than a policy decision presented as
being a rational, societal utility-maximizing choice.
Proposition 1b: Policy decisions related to decision
maker's experience (linked to individual memories
stored in cognition) are more likely to be supported
than those that are abstract or remote to the decision
maker's experiences.
Thus, the above propositions suggest that the manner
in which policy questions are framed and policy maker
experience will influence decision utility assessments and
subsequent choices regarding health policies.
Affect
With respect to decision making, the influence of affect
on individuals has been shown to influence the manner in
which individuals perceive situations, the motivation of
decision behaviors, the degree of decision risk tolerance,
and the level and type of information recall people exhibit
[6,76-80]. Research has identified both state and trait
sources of affect [81-83]. State affect is the transient,
short-term mood, while trait affect (typically referred to
as positive and negative affect) is the more global overall
mood that tends to be stable over time [82]. Individuals
high in positive affect tend to reflect enthusiasm, alert-
ness, and a positive outlook on life, while individuals high
in negative affect tend to experience dissatisfaction and
distress and have a poor outlook on life [69,73,82-84].
State influences are generally less reliable, stable, and pre-
dictable than trait influences; thus, they are more resis-
tant to decision-making process improvements [81,83].
While much research into affect and cognition focuses on
the influence of induced transitory mood (state), we focus
here on the long-term effect of one's trait affect on cogni-
tive processing due to the more stable and predictable
nature of trait affect [83,84]. The focus on trait affect in
behavior and cognitive processing is critical, given that
affect has been shown to play a dominant role in both
decision making and organizational outcomes [68,81,84-
86].
Trait affect research identifies both positive and nega-
tive affect as influences on cognitive processing and deci-
sion-making behavior [69,81-84]. Affect has been found
to act as an influence on perceptions of risk, event cer-
tainty, and gains/losses, thereby influencing the individ-
ual's perceptions and subsequent decision choices
[68,73]. Individuals with high positive affect are more
likely to perceive risky situations as being more certain
and are less likely to believe that risky decisions will cre-
ate negative personal outcomes than negative affect per-
sons. Other studies measuring perceptions of an
organization's strategic business environment found high
negative affect individuals were more likely to have poor
perceptions of the organization's performance, potential
industry growth, and industry complexity [73,87,88].
Similar results with negative affect individuals have been
found with perceptions of job performance and work atti-
tudes [69,83,85]. The affect literature supports the con-
clusion that trait affect is a robust phenomenon that
influences the decision-making process.
Social information processing models postulate that
affect-related concepts are stored in permanent memory
bins in much the same fashion as knowledge and experi-
ences [10]. Affect is labeled and stored as specific repre-
sentations, such as happy, angry, or sad. These emotions
can be labeled in permanent memory as independent
feelings or as associations with previous events and expe-
riences. If a goal-directed information process is trig-
gered by affect, it is highly probable that a different
memory process will occur than a goal-directed process
with no affect. Individual affect can then serve as a driver
and/or a filter of the memory search. Affect is an impor-
tant component of deliberative information processing
and is likely a key influence in complex cognitive tasks
such as deliberative decision making [63,88-90]. In gen-
eral, positive affect has been shown to trigger quicker,
more flexible, and more efficient processing strategies.
Conversely, negative affect tends to trigger slower, more
systematic, and more analytical processing strategies
[6,77,79,88-92]. In addition, personal importance medi-
ates the affect-cognitive processing relationship during
decision making when greater personal importance
encourages decision makers to utilize self-serving judg-
ment strategies [93]. For example, individuals with high
levels of negative affect are more prone to make biased
choices when decisions were personally relevant [91].
While affect and policy decision making has not been
extensively studied, based on the strength of the evidence
supporting affect as an influence on cognitive processing,
the following exploratory propositions are presented:
Proposition 2: Policy makers' trait affect will influence
the degree of risk tolerance and uncertainty they will
allow in supporting/devising new policies. Those high
in positive affect are more likely to support policies
with high risk and high uncertainty, while those high
in negative affect are more likely to support policies
with minimal risk and minimal uncertainty.
Given that many health policy decisions are fraught
with emotional subtext, the above propositions add to
our understanding of the mechanics of cognitive infor-
mation processing through the recognition of individual
affect as an influence in the cognitive processing/memory
search process during decision making. Affect can and
does serve as a subjective force on policy makers during
the health policy decision process.
Heuristics
The final area of influence included in the cognitive infor-
mation processing framework is heuristics. CognitiveMcCaughey and Bruning Implementation Science 2010, 5:39
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processing research has found that one's repetitive use of
specific procedures and knowledge results in automatic
ways to process information [64-66]. In complex decision
situations, this automatic processing becomes a domi-
nant force in information processing and results in cogni-
tive shortcutting tactics. This behavior has major
implications for the rationality assumptions of EBDM.
Heuristics are cognitive processes where full informa-
tion processing requirements are bypassed and mental
shortcutting occurs [66,71,73,94]. Heuristics are mental
'rules of thumb' that make decisions easier by reducing
the complexity of information processing. They operate
through the use of categorization to interpret informa-
tion. New information is categorized based on familiar
knowledge drawn from memory bins and results in more
automatic processing than would normally be required
[10]. Although there are many different heuristics, they
are categorized based on the similarity of types of cogni-
tive processing being utilized [66]. The three main cate-
gories of heuristics include availability,
representativeness, and anchoring and adjustment
[10,66].
The availability heuristic is the tendency for a decision
maker to assess the frequency, probability, or likely cause
of an event based on similar occurrences readily accessi-
ble in one's memory bins. Availability exerts a strong
influence when the event evokes vivid emotions and is
easily recalled [66]. Many media reports tend to exhibit a
certain degree of sensationalism or priming that helps
foster an availability heuristic [95]. For example, a health
policy decision regarding the distribution, labeling, and
storage restrictions of lethal drugs in hospitals will likely
be strongly influenced if the media has recently presented
a story about recent deaths that have occurred in emer-
gency rooms from a mix-up between sodium chloride
and potassium chloride. This example highlights the
observation that decision makers spend considerable
time and energy on a policy decision when linked to
recent dramatic events profiled in the media [2,3,5].
While serious drug interactions or mix-ups are a rare
occurrence, many media stories about healthcare system
efficacy include a dramatic, emotional component that
can easily trigger an availability heuristic in related deci-
sion situations.
The second heuristic, representativeness, occurs when
decision makers' form their judgment of an event/target
based on the perceived similarity of the event/target's
attributes to a pre-existing prototypical category. In doing
this, statistical probabilities are erroneously discounting
[66]. For example, a policy maker may decide in favor of a
health policy supporting mandatory immunizations for
meningitis based on the successful implementation of
other childhood immunization policies that have helped
minimize the spread of contagious diseases among chil-
dren (e.g., measles). The policy maker may then fail to
account for the risk factors associated with contracting
meningitis, which are statistically less probable than risks
associated with contracting other contagious diseases
such as measles [96]. Using the representativeness heuris-
tic, the policy maker's decision is influenced by a simplis-
tic cognitive shortcut that fails to consider relevant and
potentially critical evidence.
Finally, the third heuristic, anchoring and adjustment,
involves a decision maker's utilization of a personally rel-
evant initial value (derived from memory) as an initial
determination point about the value of a decision assess-
ment [66]. Subsequent assessment of each decision
option's value is adjusted based on the initial anchor
point that the decision maker identified. For example, a
policy maker determines amounts of financial support for
a regional health authority using the previous budget to
set the current financial budget irrespective of need,
extenuating circumstances, or technological require-
ments. This results in potentially irrelevant data being
used to determine the value and outcome of a key deci-
sion alternative, such as future budgeting and healthcare
resource spending.
The utilization of heuristics in decision making has
been shown to be a robust source of influence in the
assessment and judgment of decision options, such as the
likelihood of contracting a disease, identifying probabili-
ties of accidental fatalities, information identification,
and pharmaceutical risk [66,71,73,75]. Cognitive heuris-
tics serve as a trigger to a prototypical representation of a
situation/decision, thereby creating a judgment or
response based on memory bin representations from pre-
vious experiences rather than a judgment based on the
evidence of the current situation [9,10]. This linkage of
decision-making heuristics to experiences during cogni-
tive information processing supports the following prop-
osition:
Proposition 3: Policy makers who are presented with
cognitively difficult policy information and who have
available in their memory a relevant heuristic will uti-
lize that specific cognitive shortcut to support the
presented policy, while those individuals who do not
have an available relevant cognitive heuristic will be
less likely to use a heuristic in support of the pre-
sented policy.
The purpose of discussing information processing is to
comprehend how incoming information and cognitive
shortcutting are common occurrences that simplify cog-
nitive processing demands [9,10,32,44,48,64,73]. Given
the complexity of most nations' health system challenges,
cognitive shortcutting by policy makers is to be expected.
However, one must be mindful that cognitive shortcuts
do not ensure that the final decision best resolves a prob-McCaughey and Bruning Implementation Science 2010, 5:39
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lem, and cognitive shortcutting fails to follow the expec-
tations of EBDM [66].
Conclusions
Evidence-based health policy can alter the manner in
which healthcare policy is presently administered, and its
growing prominence in many healthcare systems war-
rants examination. However, the policy process, irrespec-
tive of the nation or health system, is not a linear, rational
model in which an idealized solution for a public problem
can be ascertained and optimally implemented
[13,19,30]. In this era of increasing prevalence of EBDM,
the rationality assumptions in EBDM must be challenged
to ensure effective policy decision making and high qual-
ity care for all citizens.
This paper has argued that cognitive information pro-
cessing is fraught with many opportunities for subtle fac-
tors to influence policy makers' assessment of decision
options. These factors are then likely to influence the
resulting policy decision in a manner that is inconsistent
with many of the evidence-processing expectations of
EBDM. Given consideration of the complexity of cogni-
tive information processing and the role of individual
goals in how information is being processed, it is not sur-
prising that health policy makers would readily adopt
cognitive processes that simplify decisions. The cognitive
information processing framework for health policy deci-
sion making presented here (Figure 3) depicts how health
policy decisions might be subtly influenced by non-ratio-
nal factors. Even when policy makers do not make deci-
sions in isolation, individual subjectivity and potential
biases enter the group decision process, thus influencing
the outcomes.
The multi-billion dollar question is how can cognitive
information processing be improved in order to ulti-
mately lead to better health policy decisions? The infor-
mation presented and the propositions presented
highlight weaknesses in the decision-making process.
Many organizations and agencies have policy enhance-
ment strategies already in place [13], so the comments
here are directed towards two overarching components
of EBDM and, ideally, will aid in improving current deci-
sion-making practices. The first component, what is the
nature of the evidence being created by researchers to be
utilized in EDBM, and the second component, what prac-
tices can foster better decision making on the part of the
policy makers:
1. Within the first component, an initial challenge
arises around the manner in which health services
research is conducted. As healthcare is a multi-sector
industry, it draws health services researchers from a wide
variety of health and social science disciplines (e.g., man-
agement, economics, political science, sociology, nurs-
ing). Deriving from these various epistemologies,
research is theorized, conducted, analyzed, and evaluated
using many different methods [97,98]. As a result, stud-
ies, methods, and subsequent findings may or may not be
accepted as valid based upon one's philosophical and the-
oretical orientation regarding science [97,99]. This com-
pounds the dilemma of defining evidence and identifying
superior evidence to be used in EBDM [13]. Evidence, as
we know, is a major element of EBM (the precursor to
EBDM), and the hierarchical evidence spectrum argued
by Sackett and others highlight Randomized controlled
trials (RCTs) and meta-analyses as the gold standard of
evidence [100]. This EBM foundation privileges positivist
science and diminishes research conducted outside the
empirical, quantitative perspective to being of lesser
value, an unfair and unfounded position. As researchers
are the individuals who produce most of the evidence, it
is incumbent for these individuals to orientate themselves
to the philosophy of science in order to gain an apprecia-
tion for the myriad of paradigms vis-à-vis the basic ques-
tion of what is knowledge, what is science, and what is
evidence [101]. The outcomes of this imperative aca-
demic exercise should see health services researchers
embrace various research methods and the validity of
findings across the research spectrum, thereby minimiz-
ing some of the existing confusion surrounding the ques-
tion of what is good evidence and what evidence should
be used.
2. Continuing within the first component, the second
challenge derives directly from the first--translating
research findings into evidence that is amenable to the
end-users. In this call, we define the end-users of health
services research to be decision makers, managers, politi-
cians and others rather than the practitioners who utilize
research for clinical practice from such sources as the
Cochrane Collaboration [13]. Many researchers have
highlighted the myriad of difficulties translating health
services research into information readily understood
and useable by the health services community
[13,100,102]. As such, it becomes vital that health ser-
vices researchers pursue improvements in how they pre-
pare and report research for the end-users, including
actions such as:
a. Linking research projects to end-users through needs
analyses and the inclusion of end-users in the research
agenda/program. This will aid in articulating the context
of the research, identifying the relationship and purpose
of the research to key stakeholders, and explicate how the
findings can translate into meaningful policy achieve-
ments. These actions should then serve to create a mutu-
a ll y be ne ficial  r e la t io ns hi p wit h bot h pa rti es  ha ving  a n
investment in seeing the research findings utilized.
b. Preparing research findings for dissemination with
sensitivity to language, inferences, and assumptions typi-
cally found in academic writings. Expecting end-users toMcCaughey and Bruning Implementation Science 2010, 5:39
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have a full comprehension of 'research speak' sets up the
dissemination mode for ineffective translation as cer-
tainly as would it be if health services researchers were
expected to have full comprehension of the language, jar-
gon, and acronyms commonly used in 'med speak'. The
ability to ensure data, findings, and reports are expressed
in commonly used language will aid decision makers to
use the available evidence. Additionally, this may help
alleviate situations in which decision makers are attempt-
ing to utilize evidence with conflicting information and
conclusions.
3. Within the second component, fostering improved
decision making, the next challenge is finding a balance
between individual utility assessments and stakeholder
utilities. To improve decision making, there are a number
of suggestions and improvements to pursue including:
a. Given that policy making does not occur in isolation,
it is important to identify the components of the network
that are relevant and require consideration (e.g., institu-
tions, industry, organizations, affiliates, government
departments, fiscal budget constraints). Within that,
coordination of information gathering and clarification of
policy objectives that articulate the goals and objectives
of the various stakeholders will help to define the utility
objectives of a given policy. Using this information, policy
direction can then be orientated to achieve the desired
outcomes for the various stakeholders.
b. Assessment of the policy alternatives by stakeholder
groups with diverse interests and objectives. Independent
reviews will assist with critical review of government pol-
icy and help to promote policy that best meets public
needs and maximizes the utility of broader stakeholder
groups.
c. Policy implementation and subsequent outcomes
require in-depth scrutiny and evaluation to ensure the
policy is meeting its initial objectives. While 'policy eval-
uation' modes are often found in many policy models, the
consistency of evaluation and response to such evalua-
tions are often cursory and, many times, ineffective
[13,19,25]. Involving stakeholders to become part of the
policy creation process naturally leads to their participa-
tion in the evaluation process. Having this added element
will help to ensure that thorough evaluation does occur,
reflects the outcomes attained, and maximizes stake-
holder utility.
4. Continuing within the second component (improved
decision making), another challenge involves the actual
decision-making process when groups are involved
[13,19,25,103]. Group decision making has its own limita-
tions (see Bazerman, 1998, for in-depth discussion) and
decision processes need to be balanced with effective
group decision making tools [58,104].
a. Decision-making processes within groups often
involve either a process of inquiry (collaborative problem
solving) or a process of advocacy (a function of persua-
sion and opinion influencing). Clearly identifying the
nature of the policy decision will help direct the roles of
the participants toward seeking ideas and solutions ver-
sus efforts to polarize the group toward one or two out-
comes. Specific goals and direction must be spelled out to
the involved group(s) in order to ensure the decision pro-
cess, whether problem solving or persuasion, fulfills the
overarching policy objectives [103].
b. Utilizing structured group decision-making pro-
cesses will assist in minimizing the common traps of
group decisions, such as non-rational escalation of com-
mitment and the groupthink phenomenon [58,96,104].
For example, establishing a set time for problem identifi-
cation, solutions, and discussion, utilizing actions to
combat the groupthink, such as designating specific indi-
viduals to function as 'devil's advocate', encouraging dis-
sent and debate to optimize productivity, identifying and
curtailing pressure for conformity, and recognizing the
political vulnerabilities with the group(s).
c. Controlling the structure of the group and the indi-
viduals who comprise the decision-making body will help
ensure diversity of utility, needs, experience, knowledge,
skills, and abilities. Diverse groups are known to be more
creative in their decision processes as a result of their
diversity and tend to attain more creative solutions to
issues being addressed [59,66]. Therefore, advocates of
various positions and backgrounds can be appointed in
order to ensure a multitude of perspectives are brought
into the policy-making decision process. This will also
help to balance out the challenge of overcoming the influ-
ence of individual affect. Decision processes involving
numerous people are more likely to strike a balance
among affect states, thereby minimizing a dominant
affect influence and balance risk taking.
5. The final strategy to counter factors that impede
optimal policy decision making, such as satisficing and
heuristic use, links back to point two (translating research
findings into evidence that is amenable to the end-users)
and the way in which research (evidence) is compiled for
end-users. To utilize evidence and minimize cognitive
shortcutting, the following steps will be useful:
a. As noted, health services research, aggregated across
studies and translated into reliable and valid findings, is a
key to evidence-based decisions. This information needs
to be readily available to decision makers in the policy
formulation process. Availability of translatable data
would expand the individual experience factor and
become part of the information basis that influence deci-
sion making.
b. The three heuristics discussed were availability, rep-
resentativeness, and anchoring and adjustment. Policy
research papers and briefs should recognize these heuris-
tics and focus on summaries that increase availability ofMcCaughey and Bruning Implementation Science 2010, 5:39
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relevant information, articulate data that clarifies best
practice of similar problems and issues, and provide data
on relevant anchors, baseline, and tracked performance
indicators such as the scorecards used by many agencies
and organizations.
c. Finally, organizational commitment to educating and
training key decision makers in decision-making pro-
cesses will help provide the foundation and knowledge to
assist individuals in recognizing when heuristics are
being used and providing the opportunity for interven-
tion if the heuristics are detrimental to the policy deci-
sion. Training key individuals in decision-making skills is
as valuable to policy making as teaching negotiation skills
is to those who participate in workplace negotiation,
union contracts, and conflict resolution.
All of the above suggestions were made to encourage
and support the discussion of alternatives to improve the
health policy decision process and, ultimately, the deliv-
ery of health services across the globe. Increased recogni-
tion of the inherent biases and individual decision-
making flaws is a first step of aligning policy goals with
decision utilities. Additional alignment may be achieved
by dedicated efforts to improve the cognitive information
process and the information available to policy makers.
In presenting our cognitive information-processing
framework, we contribute to the health policy decision
literature by developing a framework that captures a wide
variety of factors influencing decision-making situations.
Furthermore, we argue that these considerations are
globally relevant and that a comprehensive understand-
ing of the mechanisms of cognitive processing aids deci-
sion makers in developing awareness of how they process
relevant decision information and how they may be sub-
tly influenced while discounting actual evidence. In addi-
tion, empirical studies could be designed to test the
degree to which these issues impact health policy deci-
sion in various settings. Identifying and better under-
standing these influences will empower both health
policy makers and managers to enhance their decision-
making. The mechanics of decision making and how
individual cognitively process information when evaluat-
ing decision alternatives must become explicit knowledge
that is utilized to aid the EBDM goals of policy makers.
We posit that a greater awareness of the reasons behind
policy makers' actions will promote better and more
informed decisions.
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